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Introduction 
A study for the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) by the author and 
colleagues concluded that institutional rankings were being used for a broader range of 
purposes than originally intended, and bestowed with more meaning than the data alone may 
bear (Locke, Verbik, Richardson & King, 2008).  The study found, in particular, that higher 
education institutions in England were strongly influenced by rankings in both their strategic 
decision-making and more routine management processes.  Case study institutions reported 
increasing reference to the rankings by prospective students and their families and by 
academics seeking job opportunities.  Other studies have highlighted their use by employers in 
the marketing of graduate jobs and the selection of candidates (Morley & Aynsley, 2007).  Yet, 
analysis of three UK national tables and two world rankings confirmed they largely reflected 
institutional reputation and resources rather than the quality or performance of institutions. 
A higher education institution’s reputation is based on how attractive it is, and therefore 
how selective it can be, with regard to students, academic and other professional staff, research 
funders and partnerships.  As higher education becomes increasingly subject to marketization, 
reputation becomes critical because it is regarded by universities, employers, government and 
the best qualified and most mobile students as ultimately more important than quality.  
However, the diversion of resources towards activities that enhance institutional reputation 
may actually detract from the quality and performance of educational activities that are likely 
 2 
to be of most interest to potential students and their families.  Expenditure on extensive 
marketing campaigns, impressive new buildings and facilities and attracting international 
research ‘stars’ are thought to be a signal of “high quality” and therefore likely to increase 
shares in the markets for students, consultancy services, and research funds.  But this may mean 
that money is not spent on supporting students’ learning, improving educational resources, and 
the professional development of younger academic staff. 
The interaction between rankings and marketization helps to explain why compilers and 
publishers have been surprised by the influence of their rankings: market mechanisms and 
responses to these have transformed their (not entirely innocent) attempts to provide simple 
and ‘user friendly’ guides to the higher education landscape for prospective students and their 
families into vehicles for auditing and producing changes in performance.  It also explains why 
attempts by higher education institutions themselves to boycott rankings have largely failed: 
rankings are linked with larger and more far-reaching changes in economies and society that 
cannot simply be rejected, and they appear to have to be, at least in part, accommodated, even 
where they are resisted in principle. 
However, this accommodation – a form of internalization and, ultimately, 
institutionalization of ranking systems’ rationales and processes – may produce unintended and 
undesirable consequences for higher education institutions.  The concepts of internalization 
and institutionalization help to explain the processes by which ranking systems logic becomes 
embedded in organizational structures and procedures and established as the norm, despite 
initial skepticism and resistance.  They also help to illuminate the differential responses to 
rankings of distinct types of institution and the different parts within an institution, the relations 
between internal units and university-wide management, and the activities within institutions 
– together with the unfolding of these responses over time – that have yet to be explored 
empirically to any great extent and in any detail. 
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This article asks how we can conceptualize the ways in which organizational members make 
sense of, and then respond to, rankings.  Here, the approaches adopted by some U.S. researchers 
seem most likely to be fruitful.  The empirical basis of the argument is a re-analysis of the 
aforementioned study of institutions responding to rankings drawing on the conceptual 
framework already outlined.  This is supplemented by reflections on the emergence of more 
sophisticated web sites presenting detailed statistics that enable prospective students – and 
others – to compare courses and institutions on indicators such as modes of student assessment 
and employment outcomes. With the transfer (in England) of the majority of the cost of study 
to students, these developments appear to be intensifying the impact of rankings and other data-
driven market mechanisms.  The key findings of these analyses are discussed, building on those 
of an earlier version (Locke, 2011a).  The article concludes by calling for further differentiated 
and conceptually-informed empirical investigation of the influence of rankings and other data-
driven logics on, and within, higher education institutions. 
Institutions responding to rankings 
How can we conceptualize the ways in which higher education institutions and their members 
internalize the logic of ranking systems, and their influence becomes institutionalized in 
organizational processes and structures?  A number of U.S. researchers have begun to tackle 
this, although largely focusing on how rankings influence specialist academic organizations, 
such as law schools and business schools. 
Espeland and Sauder (2007) have employed the concept of ‘reactivity’ – or how people 
change their behavior in reaction to being evaluated, observed, or measured.  A reactive 
measure is one that changes the phenomenon it is designed to evaluate, because those who are 
being evaluated begin to concentrate on the measure rather than the activity.  Espeland and 
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Sauder conceptualize the nature of reactivity as patterns that shape how people within 
organizations make sense of things and how they interact with rankings, each other, and other 
institutions.  They identify two of the most important mechanisms that induce reactivity, ‘the 
self-fulfilling prophecy’ and ‘commensuration’. 
Self-fulfilling prophecies are: 
Processes by which reactions to social measures confirm the expectations or predictions that are 
embedded in measures or which increase the validity of the measures by encouraging behavior that 
conforms to it. (Espeland & Sauder, 2007: 11) 
Examples include adopting improved ranking positions as an explicit institutional goal and 
using rankings to characterize and market the institution to external audiences. 
Commensuration is characterized by: 
The transformation of qualities into quantities that share a metric…(It) shapes what we pay attention to, 
which things are connected to other things, and how we express sameness and difference. (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007: 16) 
Ranking systems, for example, simplify complex information, decontextualize it so that it 
can be organized and integrated in particular ways, and eliminate huge amounts of other, 
qualitative, information that cannot be assimilated within the system.  Many of the factors most 
important to prospective students are undervalued or entirely excluded by compilers.  But, 
because numbers are depersonalized, they appear more authoritative and definitive and, once 
they are decontextualized, they can be put to new purposes in new contexts, such as the internal 
management of higher education institutions. 
The authors argue that these two means of inducing reactivity tend to produce effects at 
different rates: commensuration can have an immediate effect because it changes the form of 
information; self-fulfilling processes, however, may only emerge gradually, as it takes time for 
people to alter their expectations and modify their behavior accordingly.  Higher education 
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institutions’ initial reactions may be dismissive, but when it becomes clear that others – 
prospective students, their parents, graduate employers, alumni, other higher education 
institutions, lay governors and government officials – are taking notice of rankings, managers 
start to treat them more seriously.  They may then seek to understand the ranking systems and 
how their institutions’ data are employed in the calculation of ranking positions.  They may 
criticize the criteria used by compilers, seek to obtain modifications and attempt to ‘adjust’ the 
information they present.  Later on, institutions might start to invest in improving their rank 
positions, adjusting decision making to take account of the effects on rankings, using them for 
promotional purposes, and incorporating them in strategic planning. 
In detailing how the most important mechanisms of inducing institutions’ reactivity to 
rankings, Espeland and Sauder have started to explore the means by which organizational 
members begin to internalize the logic of rankings and how their influence becomes 
institutionalized in processes, systems and structures over time.  This is not to suggest that these 
are smooth, uncontested, or inevitable changes.  It may even be that, while recognizing and 
criticizing the transforming influence of rankings, institutional members feel compelled – by 
reduced public funding, market forces, institutional leaders, or government or state policy, for 
example – to facilitate and extend their effects (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  Low rankings, in 
particular, can lead to a – seemingly unstoppable – downward spiral of negative impacts on 
funding, student enrollment, staff recruitment, and research capability (Walpole, 1998). 
Espeland and Sauder have gone on to develop a more sophisticated understanding of how 
organizations respond to rankings in a later article (Sauder & Espeland, 2009).  They have 
developed a Foucauldian analysis to explore how rankings have permeated U.S. law schools 
so extensively, preventing them from resisting their influence, despite vociferous protests.  
Drawing on Foucault’s conception of discipline, they argue that it is difficult for institutions to 
buffer these institutional pressures because of the ways in which organizational actors tend to 
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internalize external pressures and become self-disciplining.  This internalization is fostered by 
the anxiety produced by rankings, the resistance they provoke, and the attraction for 
administrators and others of trying to manipulate them. 
These complex processes of accommodation involve “an assortment of actors who struggle 
to reconcile their sense of themselves as professional educators with an imposed market-based 
logic of accountability” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009: 66).  Their reactions may vary and change 
over time – some may try to resist and others may focus on attempts to manipulate the rankings 
– but, the authors argue, rankings become naturalized and legitimized as arbiters of status for 
the vast majority of institutions and their members. 
Sauder and Espeland’s conceptual framework allows them to analyze the influence of 
rankings in a dynamic and nuanced way.  It highlights how rankings are not simply imposed 
on institutions of higher education from outside, and that resistance and manipulation are 
possible.  As in their earlier article, their approach also acknowledges how institutions’ 
responses evolve over time, and how rankings seduce as well as coerce.  This is an important 
antidote to those analyses that underestimate the power of institutions to respond actively to 
environmental forces and that assume they react passively to external pressures.  Ultimately, 
though, even resistance and manipulation lead to the insinuation and normalization of ranking 
systems logic, and there is little sense in Sauder and Espeland’s analysis of any positive or 
constructive effects for some institutions and for some stakeholders.  Moreover, the 
Foucauldian concepts they employ do not lend themselves to exploring the reverberations of 
rankings within institutions, for example, how they are used by governing bodies and senior 
management to drive change, by particular disciplines to argue for more resources and by 
individual academics to enhance their career prospects.  Also, the language of ‘impact’ and 
‘buffer’ is one dimensional.  Effectively, it only countenances two possible responses to the 
 7 
normative pressure of rankings: conformity or resistance – and ultimately, anyway, resistance 
turns out to be ‘futile’.  Yet, conformity to rankings is not an inevitable or prescribed process. 
There have been few attempts in the literature so far to understand why organizations vary 
in their responses to rankings and why some are more likely than others to change as a result 
of such external pressures (Martins, 2005).  Analysis needs to examine not just the differences 
in the degree of change, but also variations in the nature of that change.  Whether, where, when 
and how rankings serve as an incentive for change may depend on the academic unit, the nature 
of the ranking and the length of time during which a lower than expected (or desired) ranking 
is experienced (Walpole, 1998).  The answers to these questions will depend on careful 
empirical analysis and cannot simply be ‘read off’ from the generic features of rankings and 
the common reactions of higher education institutions and their members.  The remainder of 
article attempts to make a start in this more differentiated approach to understand the influence 
of rankings on higher education institutions in a specific territory, England. 
Analysis of English Case Studies 
This section presents the results of a re-analysis of the detailed findings of case studies of six 
higher education institutions in England (Locke, Verbik, Richardson & King, 2008).  This 
revealed six main ways in which different types of higher education institution and distinct 
levels (e.g. governing bodies, senior management, school and department) and parts of 
institutions (academic, administrative, marketing, recruitment and admissions, curriculum 
committees, data and planning, and so on) are affected by, react to, and use rankings in various 
ways. 
 
1. Strategic Positioning and Decision-making 
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Rankings are now one of the main mechanisms for higher education institutions to position 
themselves – in markets, as members of particular lobbying groups and in formulating their 
institutional missions and aims, for example.  For those institutions just below the ‘elite’, the 
national tables are, perhaps, more key to strategic positioning, because they can help to 
distinguish a university in the minds of the public from the mass of mid-table institutions.  It is 
important for these universities to situate themselves within ‘competitive sets’ or clusters of 
institutions immediately above and below them in the rankings.  One such institution sought to 
emulate the institutions at the top of their set or band as these have the same ‘background’ and 
‘heritage’.  The governing body and senior management spent a lot of time asking why their 
‘peer competitors’ had done better in the national tables and what they would have to do to 
catch them.   
Indeed, it is often the lay governors of an institution that have become most exercised about 
ranking positions and appear more susceptible to ambitious and unrealistic expectations about 
where the institution could or should be positioned.  League tables simplify complex processes 
and are familiar from other areas of competitive activity, such as sport and business.  They are 
a handy way for lay governors to exert pressure on a university management who may seem 
‘complacent’ or constrained by academic obduracy and belligerent trade unions.  In one former 
polytechnic, much lower than other similar institutions in the national tables, the vice-
chancellor had committed to improving the university’s position but, in the view of one 
governor, ‘had made a rod for his own back’ and risked his own job security.  In another former 
polytechnic, highly positioned among its peers, the governors were unwilling to bankrupt the 
university just to improve rankings but were keenly aware of their importance, particularly in 
the international student market on which the institution relied for a significant proportion of 
its income. 
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2. Redefining Activities and Altering Perceptions 
A senior manager in a small university college thought that league tables had highlighted how 
the institution had not been ‘terribly business-focused’.  ‘The business is education, but we 
haven’t measured that and improved management information’.  For departmental staff in a 
former polytechnic, league tables were part of a more formalized approach to evaluation 
generally.  ‘It has taken us aback and made us realise that our tacit knowledge of ourselves and 
our ‘ranking’ in the subject community may not be objective enough.’   
Two areas of activity subject to redefinition were common to several of the case study 
institutions in our study and directly related to elements of the methodologies for compiling 
league tables: ‘the student experience’ and ‘graduate employability’.  The substitution of the 
National Student Survey (NSS) results for the increasingly out of date grades for assessed 
teaching quality awarded to academic departments by the national Quality Assurance Agency 
seems to have led to the reduction of teaching and learning to the six categories and 22 
questions included in the Survey.  For the pro-vice chancellor of one older university, the NSS 
had ‘helped’ them ‘to rebalance teaching with research’.  It was a counterweight to the periodic 
Research Assessment Exercise.  It put the spotlight on heads of departments with poor NSS 
results and introduced peer pressure from other heads to make improvements.  In several of the 
institutions, this resulted in enhancement to student support services, the building of new study 
facilities and extensive staff development activities.  The impact on teaching quality, the 
curriculum and students’ learning outcomes, however, was not so apparent. 
 
3. Evolving Responses 
Institutions’ responses to rankings changed over time.  Initially, league tables may be viewed 
as solely a media relations issue – a success to be celebrated or a public relations crisis to be 
managed.  Most institutions were naïve to begin with, uncomprehending of the methods by 
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which individual tables were compiled, and unaware of the connection between the data they 
supplied to the national statistics agency and the outcomes of the rankings.  In most of the case 
study institutions, the first action was to establish a ‘working group’ to analyze the league 
tables, including consulting with the more forthcoming compilers, and to review how data are 
gathered and submitted by the institution.  Common outcomes were to include data that had 
previously been missed out, such as departmental expenditure on subject specific libraries and 
those academics on fractional contracts.  Higher ranked universities also had to point out to 
compilers that they had included them in tables for disciplines they did not teach, due to the 
mis-coding of students.  Subsequently, discussions about league tables tended to move from 
this mid-level both upwards, to the senior management and governing body, and downwards, 
to the departments.  However, in several of the lower ranked case study institutions, it was 
evident that departmental staff remained unclear about the connection between the data they 
supplied to the centre, the institution’s submission to the national agency and the published 
league tables based on these submissions. 
Following these early stages of coming to terms with rankings, institutions began to 
translate their newfound intelligence into strategic actions.  Differences of emphasis between 
the types of institution were predictable: entry requirements and the correct assignment of 
research publications and Nobel Prize winners were a priority for the top-ranking institutions; 
graduate employment was significant for the smaller older university; and the NSS more 
important for the former polytechnics and university college.  There were more subtle 
differences, however, in the overall approaches.  Those outside, but aspiring to, the top 
echelons focused on tackling weaknesses and no longer tolerating poor performance, and were 
more willing to make resource allocations in an attempt to reach the position they felt they 
deserved.  The highly-ranked university focused more on what a ‘top-10 university should be 
doing’, developing and refining its brand and ensuring that its academics, alumni, partners, etc, 
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‘spread the word’ to the key markets – in short, it was more concerned with communicating its 
ranking successes. 
 
4. Affective Responses 
The case studies provided persuasive evidence of the effect of rankings on the ‘collective 
psyche’ of an institution and the strong emotional responses they can provoke, despite a 
common skepticism about the purposes of the publishers and the methods of the compilers.  
The general tenor of affective responses was predictable: the more highly ranked institutions 
found ‘solace’ in their success as represented by their ranking position, which gave staff a 
‘boost’ and helped students and alumni to ‘feel good’ about their university.  However, even 
here there were subtle distinctions between younger staff who were ‘thrilled to bits and felt part 
of the success’ and older colleagues who were more ‘skeptical’ about rises in ranking positions. 
In all those institutions outside the upper echelons of the league tables, however, the 
predominant emotion was hurt – a deeply personal but also collective pain.  Staff morale could 
be damaged by a poor result, especially if it occurred in an area that an institution believed it 
had focused on and developed strengths, such as supporting students’ learning or preparing 
graduates for work.  In such circumstances, there was ‘a sense of affront’ and even ‘moral 
outrage’ at the ways in which particular tables were perceived to have misrepresented the 
institution and the work of its staff.   
League tables were described as a source of stress and as leading, in some cases, to 
individual distress.  Poor results could produce considerable soul-searching, ‘a sense of 
impotence’ and the feeling that ‘you can never do well enough’.  They provoked blame – of 
others within the institution and of oneself.  Anxiety was created by changes in ranking 
methodologies and the uncertainty about what other institutions might be doing to improve 
their standings.  Longer term, these effects could undermine the self-esteem of staff and 
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students, creating ‘a malaise that lingers’ and a lasting ‘gloom’ rather than ‘dramatic slumps in 
morale’. 
 
5. Self-management 
Both senior management and departmental staff described rankings as a lever for internal 
institutional change.  On the one hand, they had helped senior administrators to gain backing 
from the vice-chancellor for actions that would not have been taken otherwise.  On the other 
hand, senior academic managers admitted to using lower than expected results to put pressure 
on middle managers – or empower them – to introduce improvements.  Deans and heads of 
departments and administrative units had been ‘hauled in’ by senior management to account 
for a poor showing.  Peer pressure from other middle managers had ‘shamed’ their colleagues 
into making amends or best practice had been disseminated from highly placed departments to 
those ranked lower.  Disappointment with ranking positions had encouraged reviews and self-
assessments, and benchmarking with other departments within the institution and with similar 
departments in other HEIs. 
As well as feeding competition between institutions, league tables had also helped to foster 
competition between departments in the same university.  This was encouraged either through 
the subject based tables produced by several of the publishers or by the institution itself 
disaggregating, by department, the data collated and submitted to the national agency and 
circulating them internally.  Together with benchmarking exercises, this element of internal 
competition was given impetus by performance management systems that targeted areas of 
‘weakness’ and aimed to ‘raise the average’ through all individual units improving their 
performance.  Ranking systems had given ‘more focus’ and attached ‘greater urgency’ to such 
initiatives. 
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These findings, and others from the case studies and survey, suggest that rankings are 
constraining decision-making and channeling it in certain directions.  In particular, they appear 
to generate among personnel in institutions a fear of failure, of criticism from peers and the 
media and of ‘blaming and shaming’.  Several interviewees highlighted the danger of this 
tendency engendering risk aversion and restricting innovation.  One respondent from a former 
polytechnic claimed this was preventing the institution from becoming a ‘properly modern 
university’. 
 
6. Degrees of Control: Resisting, Managing, Exploiting and ‘gaming’ the Rankings 
Interviewees from all the case study institutions asserted that they were not ‘driven’ by the 
league tables and some professed the naïve belief that focusing on the ‘right things’ should 
automatically lead to improved ranking positions.  Some respondents distinguished between 
‘real quality’ and the attributes favored by league table compilers.  While they acknowledged 
that their competitors were almost certainly attempting to improve their own positions, there 
was no strong sense of the zero sum nature of rankings systems or the realization that they may 
have to expend a lot of effort just to ‘stand still’ and maintain the same rank.  Also, it was clear 
that the identification of the ‘right things’ to concentrate on and what to do about them was 
being shaped by rankings systems and the key indicators employed by compilers.  Those 
institutions developing more sophisticated approaches to rankings had at least identified which 
indicators they could have some impact on, applying ‘the 80:20 principal’ (focusing 80 percent 
of their efforts on the 20 percent of the indicators they believed could be influenced).  In the 
lower-ranked institutions, the focus tended to be on spending on facilities and ‘the student 
experience’. 
In the majority of cases, institutions had concluded they could do something about their 
student survey and first destination (FDR) results, despite the lack of evidence for this.  Many 
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had mobilized final year students to complete the NSS on the assumption that ‘satisfied 
customers’ tend not to respond as willingly as those who were dissatisfied, and so results would 
improve.  Some had tried this with the FDR survey, but had only succeeded in slightly 
increasing the proportion of unemployed graduates recorded.  A few lower-ranked institutions 
had taken a more differentiated approach to improving their NSS response rate by avoiding 
large departments with a record of being dissatisfied.  These same institutions were also seeking 
to counter bad publicity circulating on social networking sites and to disseminate positive 
messages about their institution.  One interviewee believed that a personalized and 
individualized approach to students at all stages of their relationship with the university, from 
applicant to alumnus, might be one way of circumventing the league tables in the future. 
Senior managers at these same institutions acknowledged having to spend considerable 
amounts of time managing reactions to league table results and demonstrating – to governors, 
staff and external constituencies – that they were taking an informed, professional and realistic 
approach.  They were trying to maintain a degree of ‘stability’ and agree a level-headed and 
consistent attitude, ‘toning down’ extreme reactions.  They sought to ‘de-sensitize’ the league 
table ‘issue’ in the institution by ‘routinizing’ and ‘accepting them’.  These managers would 
place their analyses of rankings in a wider context, provide a ‘filter swallow’ and ‘spread some 
jam’ around their reports. 
New forms of statistical comparison: beyond rankings? 
The re-analysis of the six case studies included in the original study provides ample evidence 
and numerous examples of the ways in which different higher education institutions have been 
affected by, responded to and used rankings at various points and at different levels of the 
organization.  This analysis illustrates how institutions at various positions in the rankings, 
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operating in different markets and with contrasting histories, resources and reputations will 
differ in their approaches to mitigating the negative effects and maximizing the advantages of 
rankings.  Whether it is a ‘top’ university seeking to sustain its reputation and improve its brand 
recognition globally, or a lowly-ranked institution ‘waking up’ to the importance of reputation, 
learning the rules of the league tables game and ‘catching up’ with its peers, rankings had 
exerted a major influence on institutional behavior.  Clearly, the case study institutions were 
evolving in their responses and, no doubt, an institution’s approach could shift significantly, 
for example, due to a change of leadership or of mission.  Their tactics have continued to 
develop, not least as the methodologies of ranking systems have been revised or the bases of 
particular indicators – such as the NSS or research quality assessment – have been reformed. 
Major developments since the original study was undertaken have included the extension of 
national data collection and the emergence of increasingly sophisticated online tools for 
comparing statistical information about higher education courses, institutions, and even 
national systems.  Examples of these are the 2012 revised version of the UK web site Unistats 
(http://unistats.direct.gov.uk) – ‘The official website for comparing UK higher education 
course data’ – and U-Multirank (http://www.u-multirank.eu) – ‘a new multi-dimensional 
ranking of higher education institutions of all types, from all parts of Europe and the world’.  
Key characteristics of these systems include: their development on the basis of consultation 
with providers and users of the data, and their continuing iteration through evaluation; the 
generation of new categories of data, often ‘self-reported’ by institutions which seek to better 
describe university ‘performance’; more comprehensive data rather than a limited number of 
indicators, that aim to represent a wider range of university activities; the facility for users to 
decide how and by which indicators they wish to rank institutions; and greater degrees of 
specificity in the data, for example, on individual courses and subject disciplines as well as 
whole institutions. 
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While these tools and systems can be presented as challenging conventional newspaper 
rankings, by being more individualised for the user and, potentially, undermining fixed 
reputational hierarchies of institutions, they represent an intensification of rankings logic and 
its internalization and institutionalization by organizations and their members.  The 
development processes directly engage with multiple segments of university populations, from 
those required to gather, generate and submit data (for example, on learning and teaching 
activities and forms of assessment); to those concerned with how the university ‘appears’ once 
the web sites are ‘live’; to those seeking to improve its standing on the sites in subsequent 
years.  New institutional posts are created, and appropriately qualified individuals are seconded 
for significant parts of their time, to produce, monitor and ‘refine’ the data submitted to the 
agencies responsible for the comparison web sites.  Institutional managers seek to align internal 
procedures, reporting and accountability systems with the logic of the online tools.  Further 
empirical research is required to investigate the degree to (and the ways in) which this 
intensification of rankings logic actually influences strategic decision-making. 
Discussion 
This penultimate section of the chapter discusses the foregoing analysis in the light of the 
conceptual frameworks presented earlier in the chapter and the developing marketization of 
higher education in the UK. 
Clearly, rankings and comparison web sites deploy reactive measures, as higher education 
institutions and their members are changing and being transformed by the ways in which the 
ranking systems evaluate institutional reputation and resources.  The quantitative indicators 
selected by the compilers are largely those that are available or easily converted rather than 
close proxies of the qualities they seek to represent, i.e. they count what is measured rather than 
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measure what counts.  They exclude much of what might be considered to indicate good quality 
or high performance because they reduce complex qualitative processes to shared metrics.  So, 
for example, admissions processes become driven by the need to attract the highest qualified 
applicants; learning and teaching are restricted to ‘student satisfaction’ and the ratio of staff to 
students; and careers services are steered to concentrate on immediate post-graduation 
employment.   
Ranking systems also generate self-fulfilling prophecies.  They employ a deficit model of a 
university that seeks to quantify the degree of inferiority to Oxford and Cambridge in the UK 
league tables and to Harvard in the international rankings (Little & Locke, 2008).  They do this 
by giving the ‘best’ institution in the aggregated measures a maximum score of, say, 100 and 
calculating the lower scores according to how close they are to this maximum.  This deficit 
model encourages lower status institutions to imitate those with high status by attempting to 
maximise their scores in the key indicators.  This leads to isomorphism among higher education 
institutions and undermines diversity within the national system. 
The transformation of higher education institutions by rankings within an increasingly 
marketized environment occurs initially through a process of internalization of ranking systems 
logic by organizational members who are then seduced and compelled to institutionalize this 
in processes, systems and structures.  Despite – or, perhaps, because of – an initial sense of 
dissonance between the actual and expected (or desired) ranking position, institutional 
members seek to better understand the ranking methods and how their institution’s data 
contribute to its relative positioning.  On discovering they cannot (except for the influential 
‘elite’ institutions) persuade the compilers to modify their ranking systems to fit their own 
institutional model and mission, they find ways to optimize their data to fit the existing 
rankings.  If the institution’s trajectory is upwards in the tables, organizational members will 
feel good about this external recognition, despite their enduring skepticism.  If it is downwards, 
 18 
they will feel devalued and demoralized and seek to offer excuses and justifications and 
criticize the publishers of league tables but, nevertheless, remain obsessed by the rankings.  
Either way, institutions will assert they are not driven by league tables while doing their utmost 
to keep up with – or ahead of – their peers and managing the perceptions and expectations of 
their key stakeholders.  Every decision then needs to be assessed for its likely impact on the 
institution’s ranking position.  Ranking systems logic becomes normalized, and hence 
legitimized, if reluctantly.  Gradually, and subtly, this begins to change perceptions of higher 
education, expectations of institutions and the behavior of their members. 
Having identified those elements of rankings systems that the organization might have some 
influence over – student survey responses or expenditure on library and computing facilities, 
for example – institutions seek to make changes.  Efforts may be made to introduce 
benchmarking and ‘peer competition’, to bring all units up to the level of the best performing 
departments, and to lever institutional change.  League table measures are introduced into 
management information systems and the data are disaggregated by department, unit or 
function.  Resources may be redistributed or partially allocated in ways that are ‘ranking 
friendly’.  Work is redefined and becomes more ‘customer-focused’ and ‘business-facing’.  
Programs are reviewed, new partners are assessed and recruitment is informed by reference to 
the rankings.  Almost regardless of the position of the institution in the tables, the marketing 
professionals will find some way of using rankings to promote the organization to its major 
markets, even if this means being highly selective, only comparing the institution with a limited 
range of ‘peers’, or constructing entirely new tables to show it in a favorable light.  
Increasingly, institutions are adopting improved ranking positions as an explicit institutional 
goal.  By these, and other, means, the logic of ranking systems becomes embedded in 
institutional practices, routines, plans and, ultimately, missions. 
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However, as this analysis has sought to demonstrate, these processes of internalization and 
institutionalization vary between types of institutions at different places in the rankings.  
Responses to rankings may have been more similar between different types of higher education 
institution to start with but, as institutions have become more sophisticated in their approaches, 
and as small differences between them become magnified and exaggerated (and even created) 
by ranking systems, their strategies have gradually become differentiated by their positions in 
clusters of institutions with similar ranking positions.  They have become ensnared by different 
self-fulfilling prophecies according to whether they feature in the world rankings or the national 
tables, and which indicators they perceive they can improve on in the comparison web sites.  
Accordingly, they may decide, for example, to bolster their global reputations by concentrating 
resources on highly-cited researchers in science fields, modify their curricula to maximize 
graduate employment, or emphasize how student-focused they are in providing an ‘excellent’ 
learning experience. 
Conclusions 
Rankings have both facilitated and shaped the marketization of higher education in England, 
the UK as a whole, and elsewhere.  They have facilitated marketization by introducing greater 
competition between and within higher education institutions (Hazelkorn, 2011). Ultimately, 
they accomplish the transformation of qualities into quantities, which is both required by, and 
a consequence of, the commodification and privatization of higher education.  Rankings have 
also helped to embed the logic of the market within organizational structures and processes and 
within the minds and practices of organizational members.  They influence institutions to 
become more business-like (Martins, 2005).  They have enabled senior institutional managers 
to foster internal competition between academic units and create internal markets. In some 
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ways, in a highly regulated UK higher education market (Locke, 2011b), rankings and 
comparison sites have become a substitute for more authentic market mechanisms, such as 
unregulated tuition fees, uncapped student numbers and the free market entry of private 
providers of higher education services.   
However, UK higher education continues to be dominated by an enduring reputational 
hierarchy of institutions and, of course, ranking systems are sustained by, and themselves, 
reinforce this hierarchy (while, at the same time, modifying it).  Competition between 
institutions is localized within the rankings, occurring primarily between those of a similar 
ranking position, and the nature of this competition varies at different points in the tables 
(Grewal, Dearden & Lilien, 2008).  So, the efforts of highly ranked universities and lower 
placed institutions to improve their reputation and increase the resources available to them are 
very different.  And, while the compilers of the national rankings – along with governments – 
try to organize all higher education institutions into a single system, in reality, different types 
of institutions operate in very different markets.  Ranking systems also significantly modify 
and reshape higher education markets by appearing to influence institutions’ major ‘customers’ 
and external constituencies, such as prospective students (domestic and international), 
employers of graduates, ‘lay’ governors, governments and their intermediary agencies, and 
research funders.  By doing so, they create new forms of inequality between institutions 
(Sauder & Lancaster, 2006). 
The empirical evidence and analysis presented here clearly indicates the need to go beyond 
the investigation of ‘impacts’ and develop an understanding of how higher education 
institutions start – and continue – to engage with processes of marketization, as a way of 
surviving, prospering and managing status anxiety in changing and challenging environments, 
and how this is made possible and modified by ranking systems.   
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